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Abstract 
From 2007, New Zealand firms must report the cost of granting employee stock 
options (ESOs).  Market-based option pricing models assume that options are 
continuously tradable and thus that option holders are indifferent to the specific risk of 
the firm.  ESOs, by contrast, cannot be traded and so their cost depends on the risk 
aversion and under-diversification characteristics of the recipient.  Using hypothetical 
ESOs, we show that ESO cost is extremely sensitive to employee characteristics, 
thereby casting doubt on the usefulness of any market-based model.  Incorporating 
early exercise in the latter does nothing to resolve this problem, because the optimal 
exercise policy is itself dependent on holder characteristics which are typically 
unobservable.  Vesting restrictions help reduce the magnitude of error.    
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How much do Employee Stock Options really cost? 
 
1.  Introduction 
In recent years, employee stock options (ESOs) have been the subject of much 
criticism.  To many, the seemingly attractive link between pay and performance that 
ESOs offer has been soured by their association with exorbitant compensation 
packages, repricing in favour of ESO recipients, and general corporate malfeasance.  In 
essence, they have come to be seen as a symptom of the owner-manager agency 
problem rather than as a solution to it. 
 One commonly cited reason for the failure of ESOs to live up to their potential 
is the absence of an accounting standard requiring firms to treat ESOs as a 
compensation expense.  As far as reported profits are concerned, ESOs have been a 
free lunch, thereby encouraging the granting of too many of them on too generous 
terms.  In response to these concerns, accounting authorities have recently taken steps 
to ensure that the costs of ESOs will in future be recognised in financial statements.  
The principal authority on this issue is International Financial Reporting Standard 2 
(IFRS 2), issued in March 2004 by the International Accounting Standards Board.  In 
November 2004, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand adopted the 
same requirements in NZ IFRS 2.  In brief, this specifies that all NZ firms must begin 
recognising ESOs at their grant date 'fair value' (essentially the value the ESOs would 
trade at in the marketplace) by no later than 2007, and provides principles-based 
guidance on how fair value should be determined.    
 On the latter issue, the value of market-traded options has traditionally been 
calculated using the famous model of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) or 
some variant thereof, but IFRS 2 notes that ESOs typically have a number of more 
complex features than the type of option envisaged by those authors (henceforth BSM) 
and that an appropriate calculation of ESO cost should reflect these differences.  For 
example, IFRS 2 suggests that employees' inability to trade ESOs combined with their 
ability to exercise prior to the expiration date can drive a wedge between the BSM 
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value and actual ESO cost.  However, because IFRS 2 contains no explicit examples of 
fair value calculation, the extent to which these differences are material for valuation 
purposes is unclear.1   
 In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on this issue and assess its 
implications for accounting recognition of ESO costs.  Using a pricing model that 
explicitly incorporates non-tradability and early exercise, we calculate the 'true' cost of 
two hypothetical ESOs and compare these with the values generated by the sorts of 
methods discussed in IFRS 2.  Because ESOs cannot be traded, holders have an 
incentive to exercise these earlier than they would otherwise-equivalent traded options, 
and the strength of this incentive increases with employee risk aversion and under-
diversification.  Since the market value of any option depends on the exercise policy 
applied to it, ESO cost is thus a function of employee characteristics, in contrast to 
market-based models like BSM.  Moreover, ESO cost is quite sensitive to these 
characteristics, so any estimate from a market-based model approaches the true value 
of any particular ESO only by good luck. 
 In recent years, a number of studies have developed methods for valuing ESOs.  
Our analysis builds on the model of Ingersoll (2003), while others include Carpenter 
(1998), Hall and Murphy (2002), Huddart (1994), Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), and 
Maller et al (2002).  However, with the indirect exception of Carpenter, none of these 
explicitly calculate the sensitivity of ESO cost to employee characteristics and the 
implications of this for accurate financial reporting.     
  In the next section, we discuss in more detail some of the issues that arise in 
valuing ESOs and describe the method we use for calculating the true cost of ESOs.  
Section 3 contains our results, and section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
                                                
1 IFRS 2 does, however, contain several examples of how a given ESO value should 
be recognised in financial statements. 
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2.  What determines the cost of ESOs? 
 ESOs cannot be traded (since allowing employees to trade their options would 
undo the reasons for granting them in the first place) and usually offer a choice of 
exercise dates, a combination that has potentially significant implications for ESOs.  
When all assets are tradable, investors diversify their portfolios and thus are essentially 
risk-neutral with respect to firm-specific risk.  Hence, the value of an option equals the 
expected option payoff discounted at a rate that includes a premium for systematic 
(non-diversifiable) risk only.2  However, ESO holders typically have a large over-
investment in the firm that grants the ESOs: many have (and in some cases are 
required to have) substantial stock holdings and, more importantly, all have a large 
amount of human capital tied up in the firm, at least some of which is unique to that 
firm.  Consequently, ESO recipients are under-diversified and thus exposed to the 
unsystematic risk of the issuing firm.  As a result, the value (to the recipient) of ESOs 
equals the expected option payoff discounted at a rate that includes a premium for both 
systematic and firm-specific risk.  In short, not being able to trade ESOs lowers the 
value placed on them by their holders relative to that of traded options.                           
 However, this phenomenon is not directly relevant to the value that investors 
and accountants are interested in - the cost incurred by the firm in granting ESOs.  To 
understand the difference, suppose an employee's remuneration contract includes the 
use of a $50,000 car.  If the employee does not drive, or lives only a short distance 
from the workplace, then the value he places on the car is likely to be considerably less 
than $50,000, and may approach zero.  But the cost to the firm is still $50,000.  And 
exactly the same principle applies to ESOs.  The opportunity cost to the firm is the 
value of the ESO in the marketplace (i.e., the expected ESO payoff discounted at a rate 
including a premium for systematic risk only) since the funds potentially used to pay 
out the option could otherwise have been invested elsewhere in the market; the 
particular circumstances of the ESO holder are irrelevant. 
                                                
2 Models of option pricing are typically cast in a certainty-equivalent, rather than 
risk-adjusted discount rate, framework (although see Arnold and Crack, 2004), but 
the latter's intuition is better suited to our purpose here. 
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 Nevertheless, the preferences and diversification of the ESO holder do have an 
indirect effect on the cost of ESOs to the firm.  Returning to the company car analogy, 
the total cost to the firm depends on the employee's usage policy, insofar as a car that 
has been only lightly used will generally have a greater resale value than one with 
many kilometres on the clock.  With ESOs, exposure to the firm's unsystematic risk 
leads holders to pursue an exercise policy that differs from the one they would have 
chosen if the options were able to be traded.  This typically results in the ESO being 
exercised earlier than an otherwise-equivalent traded option, as exercise represents the 
only way for under-diversified holders to liquidate their position. Early exercise 
changes the expected option payoff, and so the cost to the firm equals this revised 
expected payoff discounted at the systematic-risk-adjusted rate used by the market.  
Thus, the cost to firms of granting ESOs differs from the value of otherwise-equivalent 
options traded in the market not because the characteristics of ESOs make them less 
valuable to recipients, but rather because these characteristics affect the optimal 
exercise policy of recipients, thereby changing the option payoff distribution.               
 Of course, it may be that employee characteristics have only a minor impact on 
exercise policy and ESO fair value, and thus can safely be ignored for reporting 
purposes, but this cannot simply be assumed.  Instead, we need some mechanism for 
assessing the sensitivity of fair value to employee characteristics, which in turn 
requires that employee exercise policy be determined simultaneously with the option 
price.  The model of Ingersoll (2003), as applied and modified by Clyne (2004), is 
particularly suitable for this purpose: it determines the optimal exercise policy for an 
ESO and then calculates the marketplace cost of the ESO to the firm given this policy.   
 Intuitively, this model proceeds in two steps.3  First, a risk-averse employee 
with excess holdings in the firm (from ESO grants, stock holdings and human capital) 
in which he is employed chooses the ESO exercise policy that maximises the expected 
present value of the option payoff.  The implicit discount rate used in this optimisation, 
                                                
3 For a full description of the model, which uses continuous time mathematics, see 
Ingersoll (2003).   The VBA code that we use to solve this model is available on 
request. 
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and hence the optimal exercise policy, depends on the employee's risk aversion and 
under-diversification.  Second, the cost to the firm is calculated by discounting, at the 
appropriate market rate, the expected ESO payoff generated by the employee's exercise 
policy.  Somewhat loosely, we can think of the first step as identifying the optimal 
employee-specific exercise date, with the second step then calculating the market value 
of exercising the option at this date.  The latter is the theoretically correct value of a 
non-traded American option; we henceforth refer to this as the actual cost model.4 
 A simple example may help illustrate this approach.  Consider an ESO that (i) 
is written on a stock currently trading at $10, (ii) is exercisable in either of the next two 
years, (iii) has an exercise price of $10.30.  In addition, as shown in Figure 1, the price 
St of the stock (which does not pay dividends) either rises by 20% or falls by 15% with 
equal probability in each of the next two years.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 The value of this ESO is determined by, and simultaneously with, the optimal 
exercise policy.  The general nature of the latter is obvious: keep the ESO alive if its 
value is greater than the exercise payoff, otherwise exercise.  At date 2, the value from 
retaining the ESO is zero (since it expires at that date), so a necessary and sufficient 
condition for exercise is simply that the exercise payoff be positive.  As a result, 
exercise occurs at date 2 if and only if S2 = $14.40, since this is the only state in which 
the stock price exceeds the exercise price.   At date 1, however, retaining the ESO is a 
viable alternative to exercising it, so the latter is justified if and only if the payoff 
exceeds the value of retaining the option until date 2.  Clearly, this is possible if and 
only if S1 = $12; whether or not it is optimal depends on the date 1 value of the ESO.  
In turn, the current (date 0) ESO value depends on whether or not exercise will occur 
at date 1.       
                                                
4 We focus solely on the issues associated with early exercise and do not consider 
possible dynamic effects resulting from time-varying parameters.     
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 To obtain the date 0 ESO value, we proceed in three discrete steps.  First, we 
calculate the date 1 ESO value, given the exercise policy that will prevail at date 2.  
Second, we use this value to determine the optimal exercise policy at date 1.  Third, we 
use the date 1 payoffs implied by this policy to calculate the date 0 ESO value.  The 
date 1 value is obviously crucial to this process since it determines the date 1 exercise 
policy and hence the current value.  Because the ESO is not tradable, a risk-averse 
employee is unable to hedge its firm-specific risk, and hence, in maximising his 
personal expected utility, requires additional compensation for bearing that risk.  
Accordingly, the date 1 value of the ESO to the employee will be less than its market 
value, and thus the employee is more likely to exercise at date 1 than purely market 
considerations would suggest.                 
 To make this point concrete and demonstrate its implications, we assume that 
the implicit discount rate embedded in the market value of the ESO is 10%, while that 
used by a hypothetical, risk-averse, and under-diversified employee is 25%.5  Then the 
market value of the ESO at date 1 is 
 
  Vm1  =   
{probability of S2 = 14.40} x {exercise payoff if S2 = 14.40}
1.1      
   =    
{0.5} x {14.40 - 10.30}
1.1   
   =    1.86 
 
Since $1.86 > $1.70 (the payoff from exercising the ESO at date 1), the ESO is worth 
more alive than dead at date 1 and so the optimal policy from the market's perspective 
is to delay exercise until date 2.  As a result, the date 0 market value of the ESO is 
simply the present value of an asset that is worth $1.86 in one year's time with 
probability 0.5 and zero otherwise.  That is 
                                                
5 Note that Figure 1 implies that the discount rate on the stock itself is 2.5%, so the 
ESO is significantly riskier than the stock.  This is a standard feature of call options 
such as ESOs - see Boyle and Irwin (2004).  In the next section, we allow all these 
discount rates to be determined endogenously as part of the equilibrium process, 
rather than arbitrarily set as in this example. 
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  Vm0 =      
{probability of S1 = 12} x {ESO value if S1 = 12}
1.1     
   =       
{0.5} x {1.86}
1.1   
   =      0.85 
 
 The calculation from the under-diversified employee's perspective is similar, 
but all payoffs are discounted at 25% rather than 10%.  His subjective date 1 valuation 
of the ESO is 
 
  Ve1 =    
{probability of S2 = 14.40} x {exercise payoff if S2 = 14.40}
1.25     
   =      
{0.5} x {14.40 - 10.30}
1.25   
   =     1.64 
 
which is less than the date 1 exercise payoff (1.70), so the optimal policy from the 
employee's perspective is to exercise at date 1.  Therefore, the employee's date 0 value 
of the ESO is equal to his subjective present value of an asset that is worth $1.70 in 
one year's time with probability 0.5 and zero otherwise.  That is 
 
  Ve0 =      
{probability of S1 = 12} x {ESO value if S1 = 12}
1.25     
   =       
{0.5} x {1.70}
1.25   
   =      0.68 
 
which is 20% less than the market value of 0.85.  However, neither Vm0 nor Ve0 
represents the cost of the ESO to the firm; the former assumes an exercise policy, and 
hence an expected payout, different from that actually followed by the employee, while 
the latter assumes an opportunity cost of funds different from that faced by the firm.  
Instead, the actual cost to the firm is the present market value of the expected liability 
created by the employee's exercise policy.  That is 
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  C0 =       
{probability of S1 = 12} x {ESO market value if S1 = 12}
1.1     
   =       
{0.5} x {1.70}
1.1   
   =      0.77 
 
which is less than the market value (0.85), but greater than the employee value (0.68).  
Under-diversification and risk aversion lower the value of the ESO to the employee, 
but are irrelevant for market discount rates and hence for the option's market value.  
But by inducing early exercise of the ESO, they also lower the cost of the ESO to the 
firm, to a level between between the market value and the employee value.  Figure 2 
summarises this outcome. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 Our focus in this paper is on calculation of the actual cost C0.  In contrast to the 
simple example above, the procedure we follow endogenously determines the market 
and employee discount rates as functions of market conditions and employee 
characteristics respectively, so the values we obtain are consistent with market 
equilibrium (which may not be the case in the example).  Of course, the usual 
difficulties in observing  employee characteristics of risk aversion and under-
diversification mean that the actual cost model may ultimately have little practical 
impact.  However, by calculating the actual costs of hypothetical ESOs, it can tell us 
something about the likely accuracy of practical methods that ignore employee-specific 
parameters.  This is the goal of the remainder of this paper.    
 
3.  Calculating the cost of ESOs               
 To illustrate the impact of non-tradability and early exercise on ESO value, we 
use two hypothetical ESOs, the details of which appear in Table 1.  ESO I is an in-the-
money option granted by a firm with moderate volatility and dividend yield; ESO II is 
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an out-of-the-money option granted by a firm with high volatility that pays no 
dividends.  If these two options were traded, exercise prior to expiration would 
potentially be optimal for ESO I (because of its positive dividend yield), but not for 
ESO II. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
A.  Non-tradability and early exercise 
 Ignoring any complications created by vesting (i.e., we initially assume the 
ESOs have vested), we begin by comparing the actual cost of each ESO with its 
corresponding BSM value.6  We calculate and report the actual cost for all values of α 
(employee under-diversification) between 0.00 and 1.00, and for three values of γ 
(employee risk aversion): γ = 1, 5, 10.  A value of α = 0.5, for example, means that the 
employee holds 50% more of his wealth in the firm that employs him than he would if 
he were unconstrained; given the importance of human capital in the wealth of most 
employees, such a figure is not especially high.  Turning to the risk aversion 
parameter, the return means and volatilities reported in Lally and Marsden (2004) 
imply that an unconstrained NZ investor with γ equal to one should invest 
approximately 130% of his wealth in the stockmarket; the corresponding values for γ 
equal to five and ten are 30% and 15% respectively.  Cochrane (2001) notes that an 
average value of γ is usually taken to be between three and five.      
 Figure 3 plots the value of ESO I.  For low employee risk aversion (γ = 1), the 
cost to the firm is very close to the BSM value of $0.26.  Indeed, unless the employee 
has virtually all of his wealth tied up in the firm, the actual ESO cost is greater than 
the BSM value.  This reflects the optimality of early exercise in the presence of a 
positive dividend yield.  For more risk-averse employees, however, the desired 
exercise date is sufficiently early to be significantly sub-optimal from the market's 
                                                
6 The BSM model is sufficiently well known to not require explicit description here; 
discussions are standard fare in all introductory finance textbooks. For a detailed 
explanation, see Crack (2004).  
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perspective and the actual cost falls below the BSM value.  The deviation can be 
significant: a risk-intolerant employee (γ = 10) with an additional 50% of his wealth 
tied up in his firm creates an ESO cost that is little more than half the BSM value.  
Intuitively, such an employee chooses to eliminate the diversification risk associated 
with the ESO by exercising it particularly early.  Although this maximises the expected 
payoff discounted at the employee's (high) subjective discount rate, it results in a lower 
(relative to holding until expiration) discounted expected payoff from the market's 
perspective.                
 
 [Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
 The situation with ESO II is somewhat different.  With much higher stock price 
volatility, even risk-tolerant employees desire exercise that is sub-optimally early from 
the market's perspective (especially as the stock pays no dividends), and so the cost to 
the firm is always, and often substantially, less than the BSM value.  Even a 
moderately risk-averse (γ = 5) and moderately over-exposed (α = 0.3) employee costs 
the firm only 40% of the BSM value of $0.59.  For such an ESO, the BSM model 
provides inaccurate estimates of the cost to the firm.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
 The differences between the various curves in Figures 3 and 4 reflect 
differences in exercise policy.  For example, the market value-maximising expected 
time to exercise for ESO I is 4.4 years (resulting in a current value of $0.28), but an 
employee with γ = 5 and α = 0.25 expects to exercise before three years are up 
(lowering the ESO cost to $0.25); increasing α to 0.75 means that exercise is expected 
to occur in approximately fifteen months (with a resultant ESO cost of $0.17).  
Although the positive dividend yield on the ESO I stock means that some degree of 
early exercise is likely to be optimal from the market's perspective, the combined 
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effects of risk aversion and under-diversification lead holders to exercise earlier still, 
thereby lowering the market value of the ESO.  
 Figures 3 and 4 confirm the commonly held view that the BSM value may 
differ significantly from the actual cost incurred by firms in issuing ESOs.  This raises 
the question of whether the BSM model can be adjusted in some simple way to 
approximate the effects of under-diversification and early exercise.  In this regard, the 
usual recommendation - contained in IFRS 2 (para B17) - is to use the expected 
exercise date in place of the expiration date in the BSM model. 
 To evaluate this suggestion, we recalculate the BSM value using the expected 
date of exercise implied by  the actual cost model.7  In panel (a) of Figure 5, we plot 
the resulting estimates for ESO I and compare these with its actual cost; panel (b) 
depicts the corresponding comparison for ESO II.  To avoid cluttering up the figures, 
we include only the curves for moderate employee risk aversion (γ = 5). 
 The accuracy of the exercise date adjustment to the BSM model differs 
significantly across the two ESOs.  For ESO I, the adjusted BSM model approximates 
the actual cost very closely, but the divergence is substantial for ESO II.  The 
difference reflects the much greater volatility of the stock covered by ESO II; the value 
of an option is a non-linear function of the time to expiration, so the accuracy of a 
linear approximation decreases with volatility.   
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
 While the comparisons depicted in Figure 5 might suggest that the standard 
adjustment to the BSM model for non-tradability and early exercise is accurate only so 
long as the underlying stock is of no more than moderate volatility, even this overstates 
the case.  The adjusted BSM values in Figure 5 are calculated using employee-specific 
expected times to exercise, which are themselves dependent on employee γ and α 
                                                
7 The expected exercise date is calculated with respect to the risk-neutral 
distribution. 
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values. As these parameters are generally unobservable (indeed, if they were available, 
then there would be no reason to assess the BSM adjustment as the actual cost model 
could be used directly), the BSM adjustment used in Figure 5 is infeasible in practice. 
 The standard, and probably the only practical, way of estimating the expected 
time to exercise is to extract some measure, typically the average, from data on 
previous exercise decisions.  Thus, for example, if past experience revealed that the 
average exercise date was one month after vesting, then the expected time to exercise 
in the BSM adjusted model would be 19 months for ESO I and seven months for ESO 
II.  However, such a procedure ignores employee-specific variation in the expected 
time to exercise and hence in ESO cost.8  In terms of Figures 3-5, any BSM estimate 
based on a generic expected exercise date is a horizontal line, and so will approach the 
actual cost of any particular ESO only by good fortune. 
 To illustrate this point explicitly, we re-calculate the BSM value for both ESOs 
using an expected exercise date equal to one month after vesting, and compare this 
with the actual cost.  As can be seen in Figure 6, the adjustment arguably makes 
matters worse.  Whereas previously (Figures 3 and 4) the BSM value was close to the 
actual cost for employees with low risk aversion and generally an upper bound for less 
risk tolerant holders, now it is a significant under-estimate for employees with low risk 
aversion and subject to pricing errors of both sign for others.  In other words, the 
adjustment has increased the absolute magnitude of error in some cases, while in others 
it has introduced ambiguity, where none previously existed, about the sign of error.  
 Note that this outcome is not an artifact of the particular expected exercise date 
we have assumed.  Any exercise date used in any model that generates an option value 
which is independent of employee characteristics will have similar problems.  Given 
that actual ESO costs are so sensitive to employee characteristics, it is obvious that any 
method or model that ignores these characteristics will produce cost estimates that are 
subject to substantial error.  
                                                
8 Of course, it also ignores variation over time in stock price volatility and the terms 
on which ESOs are granted, but we do not address these issues here.   
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 Option pricing models that are more flexible than BSM, such as the Binomial 
model, cannot overcome this problem.  If the exercise policy embedded in the 
Binomial model is not related to employee characteristics, then the resulting value is 
no more useful than the BSM value precisely because it ignores inter-employee 
variation.  And if employee characteristics are incorporated in the Binomial model 
calculation, then the problem of observing these characteristics in order to apply the 
model in practice arises.9  In the absence of reliable information about employee 
characteristics, firms have the opportunity to manipulate ESO valuations in self-
interested ways, thereby negating the intention that these valuations should provide 
more information to investors.      
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
B.  Vesting 
 Vesting restrictions have two effects on ESO cost.  First, they increase the 
probability that some options will never become eligible for exercise because, for 
example, workers cease employment with the firm before the vesting period ends.  
Second, they reduce the period of time in which exercise can occur.  IFRS 2 requires 
that the first effect be recognised by adjusting the quantity, rather than the price, of 
ESOs.  Here we focus on the second effect as this relates most closely to the exercise 
policy issue analysed above.   
 To do so, we recalculate the actual costs of our hypothetical ESOs 
incorporating the vesting restrictions listed in Table 1 (i.e., that ESO I cannot be 
exercised for 18 months and ESO II for six months).  In Figure 7, we illustrate the 
effects of this restriction for the latter option.10  The solid curve depicts the actual cost 
function for a vested ESO II held by an employee with γ = 5; the dashed curve shows 
                                                
9 In this situation, the Binomial model is essentially the actual cost model with 
longer time steps. 
10 The vertical difference between the two curves is even more pronounced for the 
longer vesting period of plan I. 
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the same function when vesting occurs in six months time.  The latter lies on or above 
the former, so imposing vesting restrictions raises the cost of ESO II.  
 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
  
 This result seems surprising, insofar as restricting the dates on which ESOs can 
be exercised unambiguously reduces their value to employees, but the reason is 
straightforward: employees who would otherwise have exercised their options sub-
optimally early from the market's perspective (i.e., prior to the vesting date) are now 
forced to wait until a later date that offers an expected payoff with a higher market 
value.  Note, however, that this need not always be the case: if market value 
maximisation required exercise before the vesting date (as might be the case for a firm 
with a high dividend yield, for example), then vesting would enforce sub-optimal late 
exercise and thus lower the ESO cost.  
 Regardless of whether it raises or lowers ESO cost, vesting always reduces the 
sensitivity of ESO cost to employee characteristics.  As Figure 7 indicates, the slope of 
the curve depicting the relationship between ESO cost and holder under-diversification 
is lower with a six-month vesting period.  Similarly, the vertical gap between curves of 
different risk aversion (not drawn) is also smaller with vesting.  In effect, vesting 
places restrictions on employees' abilities to exercise early and thus on their freedom to 
choose an exercise policy that optimally reflects their individual circumstances.     
 The importance of this point is that vesting helps reduce the inaccuracy of 
market-based option pricing models that ignore employee characteristics.  As the 
vesting period increases, the importance of these characteristics for ESO cost becomes 
smaller and the BSM figure approaches the actual cost.     
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4.  Concluding Remarks 
 Using models of market-traded options to determine the cost of ESOs is a task 
fraught with difficulty.  Because ESOs cannot be traded, employees choose to exercise 
earlier than would otherwise be the case, the extent of which depends on risk aversion 
and under-diversification stemming from over-exposure to the issuing firm.  Although 
such early exercise is optimal from the employee's perspective, it is frequently 
premature from the perspective of the market, and hence ESOs are generally less costly 
than otherwise-equivalent traded options. 
 Because the cost of ESOs is sensitive to characteristics of the employee to 
whom they are granted, standard market-based models that ignore these characteristics 
are likely to produce value estimates that differ substantially from the true cost.  
Commonly-cited adjustments, such as using the expected exercise date in place of the 
expiration date in the BSM model, or determining the optimal exercise date 
endogenously within the Binomial model, leave this fundamental problem unresolved.  
The difficulty with applying market-based models to ESOs is not early exercise per se, 
but rather the factors underlying such early exercise. 
 The principal difficulty facing ESO valuation is straightforward.  On the one 
hand, standard market-based models of option pricing ignore features integral to the 
cost of ESOs.  On the other hand, quantification of these features is necessarily 
subjective, thereby creating the potential for manipulation. 
 Fortunately, to end on an optimistic note, there are practical methods for 
mitigating this problem.  First, it should be possible to 'back out' information about 
employee characteristics from data on actual exercise decisions.  If such analysis 
revealed that these characteristics were clustered in a fairly tight range, then the issues 
highlighted in this paper are of less importance.  Second, as shown in section 3B, 
lengthy vesting periods reduce the sensitivity of ESO cost to holder characteristics.  
Third, the actual cost model assumes that ESO holders adopt an exercise policy that is 
optimal given their own particular circumstances.  However, Carpenter (1998) shows 
that incorporating an exogenous stopping process in the standard market-based model 
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for pricing American options explains actual exercise decisions about as well as a more 
general employee-specific model.  This suggests that a simple extension to market-
based models may provide accurate ESO valuations without the need to incorporate 
subjective estimates of employee characteristics.  Future research should investigate 
these issues in more detail. 
17 
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Figure 1 
Stock Price Evolution for Illustrative ESO 
 
Today (at date 0), the stock price is $10.  In subsequent years, it either rises by 20% or 
falls by 15%, both with probability 0.5.  
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 Figure 2 
Values for Illustrative ESO 
 
Today (at date 0), the stock price is $10.  In subsequent years, it either rises by 20% or 
falls by 15%, both with probability 0.5.  The ESO can be exercised at either date 1 or 
date 2 in return for a payment of $10.30.  Vmt is the date t market value of the ESO; 
Vet is the corresponding subjective employee value; C0 is the date 0 cost to the firm. 
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Table 1  
ESO Details 
Parameter values for two hypothetical ESOs.  In addition, the riskless interest rate is 
5%, market volatility is 20%, and the beta of both underlying stocks is 0.9. 
 ESO I  ESO II 
Current stock price $1.00  $0.90 
Exercise price $0.90  $1.00 
Stock price volatility 0.30  0.80  
Dividend yield 0.04  0.00  
Expiration date 5 years  5 years 
Vesting date (section 3A) vested  vested  
                     (section 3B) 18 months  6 months 
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Figure 3 
ESO I Values 
This figure plots the cost of ESO I for various combinations of employee risk aversion 
(γ) and under-diversification (α), and compares these with the Black-Scholes-Merton 
(BSM) value.  Parameter values for ESO I are in Table 1. 
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Figure 4 
ESO II Values 
This figure plots the cost of ESO II for various combinations of employee risk aversion 
(γ) and under-diversification (α), and compares these with the Black-Scholes-Merton 
(BSM) value.  Parameter values for ESO II are in Table 1. 
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Figure 5 
 
Actual Cost versus BSM Value when Time to Expiration equals True Expected 
Exercise Date   
For an employee with γ = 5, this figure plots the ESO value from the BSM model using 
the expected exercise date implied by the actual cost model, and compares it with the 
value obtained from the actual cost model.   
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Figure 6 
 
Actual Cost versus BSM Value when Time to Expiration equals Vesting Date plus 
One Month  
This figure plots the ESO cost to the firm for various combinations of employee risk 
aversion (γ) and under-diversification (α), and compares these with the Black-Scholes-
Merton (BSM) value when the time to expiration is set equal to one month after the 
vesting date.  Parameter values for the two ESOs are in Table 1. 
 
Panel (a): ESO I 
 
Panel (b): ESO II 
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Figure 7 
 
The Effect of Vesting on Actual ESO Cost  
For an employee with γ = 5, this figure plots the actual cost of ESO II under conditions 
of vesting (six months) and no vesting.   
 
 
 
  
 
